Abstract: Temporal Key Integrity Protocol (TKIP) is a sub-protocol of IEEE 802.11i. TKIP remedies some security flaws in Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) Protocol. TKIP adds four new algorithms to WEP: a Message Integrity Code (MIC) called Michael, an Initialization Vector (IV) sequencing discipline, a key mixing function and a re-keying mechanism. The key mixing function, also called temporal key hash, de-correlates the IVs from weak keys. Some cryptographic properties of the S-box used in the key mixing function are investigated in this paper, such as regularity, avalanche effect, differ uniform and linear structure. V.Moen, H.Raddum and K.J.Hole pointed out that there existed a temporal key recovery attack in TKIP key mixing function. In this paper a method is proposed to defend against the attack, and the resulting effect on performance is also discussed.
Introduction
In July 2004 IEEE published the 802.11i specification [1] for WLAN. 802.11i is a remedy for the flawed Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) Protocol in 802.11. In 802.11i RC4 encryption is used for 802.11 legacy devices and AES [2] is used for future 802.11 devices. A sub-protocol called Temporal Key Integrity Protocol (TKIP) is included in 802.11i to prevent the improper use of RC4 encryption in WEP, such as weak key scheduling [3] , Initialization Vector (IV) collusion and packet forgery [4] . TKIP is a set of algorithms wrapping WEP. TKIP adds four new algorithms to WEP: a cryptographic Message Integrity Code (MIC) called Michael to exclude forged packets, an IV sequencing discipline to remove the replay attack, a per-packet key mixing function to de-correlate the IVs from weak keys and a re-keying mechanism to provide fresh encryption and integrity keys.
In this paper we focus on the TKIP key mixing function. The key mixing function, also called temporal key hash, produces the 128-bit RC4 per-frame encryption key. This function takes as input the 128-bit Temporal Key (TK) , the 48-bit Transmitter's Address (TA) and 48-bit IV. The 48-bit IV is often called the TKIP Sequence Counter (TSC). The 32 most significant bits of the TSC are represented by IV32 and the 16 least significant bits of the TSC are represented by IV16 here. The key mixing function outputs 128-bit WEP key, the three first bytes of which are derived from the TSC.
TKIP key mixing has two phases. The input to phase 1 shall be the TK, TA and IV32. The output shall be 80-bit Phase 1 Key (P1K) . The P1K will be one part of input to phase 2. P1K is the same for consecutive frames from the same TK, TA and IV32. So P1K is often calculated once for every frames and is cached for the next phase, although it can be calculated every frame in theory. In phase 2 it takes as input P1K, TK and IV16, and outputs the 128-bit WEP key for the RC4 encryption algorithm. The key mixing process can be described as follows: 16 2 16 2 P1K = Phase1 (TK, TA, IV32) RC4Key = Phase2 (P1K, TK, IV16) For lack of space, we only give a rough description of the key mixing function. More details can be referred to [1] .
S-box in TKIP
In both phase 1 and phase 2 of the key mixing function an S-box is employed. The S-box is a non-linear substitution. It takes one 16-bit value as input and output one value with the same bit length. The S-box substitution can be viewed as a table look-up. The table look-up can be a single   table with entries and a 16-bit index, or two tables with 256 entries and an 8-bit index. In [1] the latter reference implementation is demonstrated, but IEEE Task Group I (TGi) does not expound the design principle for the S-box explicitly. By analyzing the C-language reference implementation, we derive the generation method of the S-box. It can be illustrated below: In Figure 1 , the input is one 16-bit index value 'i'. The 16-bit input is split into two i.e. Lo8(i) and Hi(i). Lo8(i) represents the 8 least significant bits of the input and Hi8(i) represents the 8 most significant bits. The AES S-box substitution will be performed with Lo8(i) and Hi8(i) as index respectively. ' 02 mod11B i ' means the 'xtime' operation in Rijndael, that is, the multiplication by x ( hexadecimal '02' ) modulo the irreducible binary polynomial ' extends an 8-bit value to a 16-bit value, of which the 8 most significant bits come from the left shift by 8 of the original octet, and the 8 least significant bits are filled with 0.
100 i S-boxes have been widely employed in private key cryptosystem. The S-box plays an important role in the symmetric cryptosystem since it is the only nonlinear portion of the algorithm. The strength of the cryptosystem depends heavily on the quality of the S-box. Much research has been concentrated on how to design a cryptographically 'good' S-box. A variety of criteria are presented in the S-box design.
Denote by the vector space of tuples of elements from . In general, an S-box, where , , can be described as a function from to , or a vectorial Boolean function
Next we will investigate some cryptographic properties of the S-box in TKIP: [7] ) A cryptographic function satisfies the strict avalanche criterion (SAC), if each output bit should change with a probability of one half whenever a single input bit is complemented. Proposition 2. The S-box in TKIP does not satisfy the SAC. For the S-box, the probability that a particular output bit will change when a single input bit is complemented ranges from 0.43 to 0.56. Proof: We compute the probability that the j-th (j=1,2,…,16) output bit will change when the i-th (i=1,2,…,16) input bit is complemented. The result is listed in a table in the appendix.
Definition 3. ([5]) Let be an
F n m × S-box, let δ be the largest value in differential distribution table of the S-box (not counting the first entry in the first row), namely,
F is said to be differentially δ -uniform, and δ is called the differential uniformity of .
F
The differential uniformity δ of an S-box is a nonlinearity criterion that can measure the strength of the S-box against differential cryptanalysis [8] . Proposition 3. The differential uniformity of the S-box in TKIP is 1024. The existence of linear structures is a weakness in ciphers. Proposition 5. The S-box in TKIP has no linear structure. [14] . If the attacker can collect a few RC4 WEP keys computed under the same IV32, he is able to recover the TK and MIC key. As claimed in [14] , this attack is only in a theoretical sense, whereas it shows the key hash function is weaker than expected. The Leak of RC4 keys are equivalent to total loss of security.
The inputs to phase 1 of the key mixing function are TK, TA and IV32. 
PPK [2] = P1K [2] PPK [3] = P1K [3] PPK [4] = P1K [4] PPK [5] 
Step 2: [7] ,TK [6] [10] and TK [11] , cited from Refs. [14] Figure 3 is an illustration on how to recover the unknown TK [10] and TK [11] . PPK [3] , PPK [4] and PPK [5] is known from an RC4 key. We can guess the value of TK [11] ||TK [10] . Then we can compute P1K [4] backward. The guess is right if we derive the same value of P1K [4] by using different WEP keys, otherwise the guess is wrong. Other bytes of TK can be derived in a similar way.
The TK recovery attack is effective from the fact that in phase 2 individual bytes of the WEP key are only correlated with certain bytes of TK. For example, PPK [5] is only correlated with TK [11] and TK [10] , other byte of TK are not involved in the derivation of PPK [5] . To enhance the security a modification in the step 2 of phase 2 is shown: Phase 2 Step 2: (TK[15] ,TK [14] More rounds of the step 2 in phase 2 are introduced. PHASE2_LOOP_CNT is the variable that denotes the loop count. How to determine the value of the variable is to be discussed later. The '+i' operation is used here for the same consideration as it is used in the loop of phase 1, that is, to avoid the slide attack [15] . The modified algorithm is immune to the TK recovery attack, since the individual byte of the WEP key is correlated with the every bit of TK and the guess must be made at the all bits of TK instead of certain bytes, which is equivalent to the brutal force attack at TK. We measured the time cost of using different rounds for computing WEP keys on a PC with 1.80 GHz Pentium CPU and 256M memory and listed the results in the What interests us is not the specific time cost, but the ratio of the time cost between the modified algorithm and the original one. We denote the time cost of computing WEP keys using only one round in step 2 of phase 2 by , which is the time cost of the original TKIP key hash function. From table 1 it is known that the time cost is increased by about 0.7 when every one round computation in step 2 of phase 2 is added. The implementation of TKIP is by means of software update and the computation must be affordable for the computation ability limited hardware. So the optimum loop counts must be determined after an extensive investigation on the early 802.11 market products. 
Conclusion
WEP has many flaws and fails to achieve its design goal. TKIP provides security enhancements for WEP. In this paper some cryptographic properties of the S-box employed in the TKIP key mixing function are investigated. A countermeasure is presented to defend against the TK recovery attack and its effect on the performance is discussed.
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Note:
The differ uniformity test program is time costly. It takes about 50 days to run the program on a PC with 1.80 GHz Pentium CPU and 256M memory.
The timing program is compiled and run in the MS Visual C++ environment for a special timing functions QueryPerformanceCounter() is invoked. This function needs a high-resolution performance counter that must supported by the hardware.When this program is running it is suggested that close other programs to avoid interference.
For the generation of the TKIP S-box we partly refer to David Jonhnston's implementation codes: http://www.deadhat.com/wlancrypto/tkip_key_mixing0.3.c
For the last timing program we partly refer to the implementation codes in IEEE 802.11i: http://standards.ieee.org/getieee802/download/802.11i-2004.pdf ①The regularity of the S-box test: #include <stdlib.h> #include <stdio.h> /* The Sbox can be reduced to two 16 bit wide tables, each with 256 entries.*/ /* The second table is the same as the first but with the upper and lower */ /* bytes swapped. To allow an endian tolerant implementation, the byte */ /* halves have been expressed independently here.
*/ unsigned int Tkip_Sbox_Lower[256] = { 0xA5,0x84,0x99,0x8D,0x0D,0xBD,0xB1,0x54, 0x50,0x03,0xA9,0x7D,0x19,0x62,0xE6,0x9A, 0x45,0x9D,0x40,0x87,0x15,0xEB,0xC9,0x0B, 0xEC,0x67,0xFD,0xEA,0xBF,0xF7,0x96,0x5B, 0xC2,0x1C,0xAE,0x6A,0x5A,0x41,0x02,0x4F, 0x5C,0xF4,0x34,0x08,0x93,0x73,0x53,0x3F, 0x0C,0x52,0x65,0x5E,0x28,0xA1,0x0F,0xB5, 0x09,0x36,0x9B,0x3D,0x26,0x69,0xCD,0x9F, 0x1B,0x9E,0x74,0x2E,0x2D,0xB2,0xEE,0xFB, 0xF6,0x4D,0x61,0xCE,0x7B,0x3E,0x71,0x97, 0xF5,0x68,0x00,0x2C,0x60,0x1F,0xC8,0xED, 0xBE,0x46,0xD9,0x4B,0xDE,0xD4,0xE8,0x4A, 0x6B,0x2A,0xE5,0x16,0xC5,0xD7,0x55,0x94, 0xCF,0x10,0x06,0x81,0xF0,0x44,0xBA,0xE3, 0xF3,0xFE,0xC0,0x8A,0xAD,0xBC,0x48,0x04, 0xDF,0xC1,0x75,0x63,0x30,0x1A,0x0E,0x6D, 0x4C,0x14,0x35,0x2F,0xE1,0xA2,0xCC,0x39, 0x57,0xF2,0x82,0x47,0xAC,0xE7,0x2B,0x95, 0xA0,0x98,0xD1,0x7F,0x66,0x7E,0xAB,0x83, 0xCA,0x29,0xD3,0x3C,0x79,0xE2,0x1D,0x76, 0x3B,0x56,0x4E,0x1E,0xDB,0x0A,0x6C,0xE4, 0x5D,0x6E,0xEF,0xA6,0xA8,0xA4,0x37,0x8B, 0x32,0x43,0x59,0xB7,0x8C,0x64,0xD2,0xE0, 0xB4,0xFA,0x07,0x25,0xAF,0x8E,0xE9,0x18, 0xD5,0x88,0x6F,0x72,0x24,0xF1,0xC7,0x51, 0x23,0x7C,0x9C,0x21,0xDD,0xDC,0x86,0x85, 0x90,0x42,0xC4,0xAA,0xD8,0x05,0x01,0x12, 0xA3,0x5F,0xF9,0xD0,0x91,0x58,0x27,0xB9, 0x38,0x13,0xB3,0x33,0xBB,0x70,0x89,0xA7, 0xB6,0x22,0x92,0x20,0x49,0xFF,0x78,0x7A, 0x8F,0xF8,0x80,0x17,0xDA,0x31,0xC6,0xB8, 0xC3,0xB0,0x77,0x11,0xCB,0xFC,0xD6,0x3A }; unsigned int Tkip_Sbox_Upper[256] = { 0xC6,0xF8,0xEE,0xF6,0xFF,0xD6,0xDE,0x91, 0x60,0x02,0xCE,0x56,0xE7,0xB5,0x4D,0xEC, 0x8F,0x1F,0x89,0xFA,0xEF,0xB2,0x8E,0xFB, 0x41,0xB3,0x5F,0x45,0x23,0x53,0xE4,0x9B, 0x75,0xE1,0x3D,0x4C,0x6C,0x7E,0xF5,0x83, 0x68,0x51,0xD1,0xF9,0xE2,0xAB,0x62,0x2A, 0x08,0x95,0x46,0x9D,0x30,0x37,0x0A,0x2F, 0x0E,0x24,0x1B,0xDF,0xCD,0x4E,0x7F,0xEA, 0x12,0x1D,0x58,0x34,0x36,0xDC,0xB4,0x5B, 0xA4,0x76,0xB7,0x7D,0x52,0xDD,0x5E,0x13, 0xA6,0xB9,0x00,0xC1,0x40,0xE3,0x79,0xB6, 0xD4,0x8D,0x67,0x72,0x94,0x98,0xB0,0x85, 0xBB,0xC5,0x4F,0xED,0x86,0x9A,0x66,0x11, 0x8A,0xE9,0x04,0xFE,0xA0,0x78,0x25,0x4B, 0xA2,0x5D,0x80,0x05,0x3F,0x21,0x70,0xF1, 0x63,0x77,0xAF,0x42,0x20,0xE5,0xFD,0xBF, 0x81,0x18,0x26,0xC3,0xBE,0x35,0x88,0x2E, 0x93,0x55,0xFC,0x7A,0xC8,0xBA,0x32,0xE6, 0xC0,0x19,0x9E,0xA3,0x44,0x54,0x3B,0x0B, 0x8C,0xC7,0x6B,0x28,0xA7,0xBC,0x16,0xAD, 0xDB,0x64,0x74,0x14,0x92,0x0C,0x48,0xB8, 0x9F,0xBD,0x43,0xC4,0x39,0x31,0xD3,0xF2, 0xD5,0x8B,0x6E,0xDA,0x01,0xB1,0x9C,0x49, 0xD8,0xAC,0xF3,0xCF,0xCA,0xF4,0x47,0x10, 0x6F,0xF0,0x4A,0x5C,0x38,0x57,0x73,0x97, 0xCB,0xA1,0xE8,0x3E,0x96,0x61,0x0D,0x0F, 0xE0,0x7C,0x71,0xCC,0x90,0x06,0xF7,0x1C, 0xC2,0x6A,0xAE,0x69,0x17,0x99,0x3A,0x27, 0xD9,0xEB,0x2B,0x22,0xD2,0xA9,0x07,0x33, 0x2D,0x3C,0x15,0xC9,0x87,0xAA,0x50,0xA5, 0x03,0x59,0x09,0x1A,0x65,0xD7,0x84,0xD0, 0x82,0x29,0x5A,0x1E,0x7B,0xA8,0x6D,0x2C };
unsigned int tkip_sbox(unsigned int index); /************************************************************/ /* tkip_sbox() */ /* Returns a 16 bit value from a 64K entry table. The Table */ /* is synthesized from two 256 entry byte wide tables. */ /************************************************************/ unsigned int tkip_sbox(unsigned int index) { unsigned int index_low; unsigned int index_high; unsigned int left, right; (flag==0) printf("no match in sbox is found!\n"); } ②The avalanche effect of the S-box test: #include <stdlib.h> #include <stdio.h> #include <math.h> unsigned int Tkip_Sbox_Lower[256] = { 0xA5,0x84,0x99,0x8D,0x0D,0xBD,0xB1,0x54, 0x50,0x03,0xA9,0x7D,0x19,0x62,0xE6,0x9A, 0x45,0x9D,0x40,0x87,0x15,0xEB,0xC9,0x0B, 0xEC,0x67,0xFD,0xEA,0xBF,0xF7,0x96,0x5B, 0xC2,0x1C,0xAE,0x6A,0x5A,0x41,0x02,0x4F, 0x5C,0xF4,0x34,0x08,0x93,0x73,0x53,0x3F, 0x0C,0x52,0x65,0x5E,0x28,0xA1,0x0F,0xB5, 0x09,0x36,0x9B,0x3D,0x26,0x69,0xCD,0x9F, 0x1B,0x9E,0x74,0x2E,0x2D,0xB2,0xEE,0xFB, 0xF6,0x4D,0x61,0xCE,0x7B,0x3E,0x71,0x97, 0xF5,0x68,0x00,0x2C,0x60,0x1F,0xC8,0xED, 0xBE,0x46,0xD9,0x4B,0xDE,0xD4,0xE8,0x4A, 0x6B,0x2A,0xE5,0x16,0xC5,0xD7,0x55,0x94, 0xCF,0x10,0x06,0x81,0xF0,0x44,0xBA,0xE3, 0xF3,0xFE,0xC0,0x8A,0xAD,0xBC,0x48,0x04, 0xDF,0xC1,0x75,0x63,0x30,0x1A,0x0E,0x6D, 0x4C,0x14,0x35,0x2F,0xE1,0xA2,0xCC,0x39, 0x57,0xF2,0x82,0x47,0xAC,0xE7,0x2B,0x95, 0xA0,0x98,0xD1,0x7F,0x66,0x7E,0xAB,0x83, 0xCA,0x29,0xD3,0x3C,0x79,0xE2,0x1D,0x76, 0x3B,0x56,0x4E,0x1E,0xDB,0x0A,0x6C,0xE4, 0x5D,0x6E,0xEF,0xA6,0xA8,0xA4,0x37,0x8B, 0x32,0x43,0x59,0xB7,0x8C,0x64,0xD2,0xE0, 0xB4,0xFA,0x07,0x25,0xAF,0x8E,0xE9,0x18, 0xD5,0x88,0x6F,0x72,0x24,0xF1,0xC7,0x51, 0x23,0x7C,0x9C,0x21,0xDD,0xDC,0x86,0x85, 0x90,0x42,0xC4,0xAA,0xD8,0x05,0x01,0x12, 0xA3,0x5F,0xF9,0xD0,0x91,0x58,0x27,0xB9, 0x38,0x13,0xB3,0x33,0xBB,0x70,0x89,0xA7, 0xB6,0x22,0x92,0x20,0x49,0xFF,0x78,0x7A, 0x8F,0xF8,0x80,0x17,0xDA,0x31,0xC6,0xB8, 0xC3,0xB0,0x77,0x11,0xCB,0xFC,0xD6,0x3A }; unsigned int Tkip_Sbox_Upper[256] = { 0xC6,0xF8,0xEE,0xF6,0xFF,0xD6,0xDE,0x91, 0x60,0x02,0xCE,0x56,0xE7,0xB5,0x4D,0xEC, 0x8F,0x1F,0x89,0xFA,0xEF,0xB2,0x8E,0xFB, 0x41,0xB3,0x5F,0x45,0x23,0x53,0xE4,0x9B, 0x75,0xE1,0x3D,0x4C,0x6C,0x7E,0xF5,0x83, 0x68,0x51,0xD1,0xF9,0xE2,0xAB,0x62,0x2A, 0x08,0x95,0x46,0x9D,0x30,0x37,0x0A,0x2F, 0x0E,0x24,0x1B,0xDF,0xCD,0x4E,0x7F,0xEA, 0x12,0x1D,0x58,0x34,0x36,0xDC,0xB4,0x5B, 0xA4,0x76,0xB7,0x7D,0x52,0xDD,0x5E,0x13, 0xA6,0xB9,0x00,0xC1,0x40,0xE3,0x79,0xB6, 0xD4,0x8D,0x67,0x72,0x94,0x98,0xB0,0x85, 0xBB,0xC5,0x4F,0xED,0x86,0x9A,0x66,0x11, 0x8A,0xE9,0x04,0xFE,0xA0,0x78,0x25,0x4B, 0xA2,0x5D,0x80,0x05,0x3F,0x21,0x70,0xF1, 0x63,0x77,0xAF,0x42,0x20,0xE5,0xFD,0xBF, 0x81,0x18,0x26,0xC3,0xBE,0x35,0x88,0x2E, 0x93,0x55,0xFC,0x7A,0xC8,0xBA,0x32,0xE6, 0xC0,0x19,0x9E,0xA3,0x44,0x54,0x3B,0x0B, 0x8C,0xC7,0x6B,0x28,0xA7,0xBC,0x16,0xAD, 0xDB,0x64,0x74,0x14,0x92,0x0C,0x48,0xB8, 0x9F,0xBD,0x43,0xC4,0x39,0x31,0xD3,0xF2, 0xD5,0x8B,0x6E,0xDA,0x01,0xB1,0x9C,0x49, 0xD8,0xAC,0xF3,0xCF,0xCA,0xF4,0x47,0x10, 0x6F,0xF0,0x4A,0x5C,0x38,0x57,0x73,0x97, 0xCB,0xA1,0xE8,0x3E,0x96,0x61,0x0D,0x0F, 0xE0,0x7C,0x71,0xCC,0x90,0x06,0xF7,0x1C, 0xC2,0x6A,0xAE,0x69,0x17,0x99,0x3A,0x27, 0xD9,0xEB,0x2B,0x22,0xD2,0xA9,0x07,0x33, 0x2D,0x3C,0x15,0xC9,0x87,0xAA,0x50,0xA5, 0x03,0x59,0x09,0x1A,0x65,0xD7,0x84,0xD0, 0x82,0x29,0x5A,0x1E,0x7B,0xA8,0x6D,0x2C }; /**************************************************/ for (i=0; i<16; i++) { for (j=0; j<16; j++) counter [i] [j]=0; } /**************************************************/ for (i=0; i<65536; i++) { var1=sbox[i]; for (j=0; j<16; j++) { var2=sbox[(unsigned int)(i^(unsigned int)(pow(2,j)))]; for (k=0; k<16; k++) { if ( !comp(var1,var2,k) ) counter [j] [k]++; } } } /**************************************************/ for (i=0; i<16; i++) { for (j=0; j<16; j++) printf("%-12f", prob[i] [j]); } printf("\n"); } /**************************************************/ } ③The differ uniformity of the S-box test: #include <stdlib.h> #include <stdio.h> unsigned int Tkip_Sbox_Lower[256] = { 0xA5,0x84,0x99,0x8D,0x0D,0xBD,0xB1,0x54, 0x50,0x03,0xA9,0x7D,0x19,0x62,0xE6,0x9A, 0x45,0x9D,0x40,0x87,0x15,0xEB,0xC9,0x0B, 0xEC,0x67,0xFD,0xEA,0xBF,0xF7,0x96,0x5B, 0xC2,0x1C,0xAE,0x6A,0x5A,0x41,0x02,0x4F, 0x5C,0xF4,0x34,0x08,0x93,0x73,0x53,0x3F, 0x0C,0x52,0x65,0x5E,0x28,0xA1,0x0F,0xB5, 0x09,0x36,0x9B,0x3D,0x26,0x69,0xCD,0x9F, 0x1B,0x9E,0x74,0x2E,0x2D,0xB2,0xEE,0xFB, 0xF6,0x4D,0x61,0xCE,0x7B,0x3E,0x71,0x97, 0xF5,0x68,0x00,0x2C,0x60,0x1F,0xC8,0xED, 0xBE,0x46,0xD9,0x4B,0xDE,0xD4,0xE8,0x4A, 0x6B,0x2A,0xE5,0x16,0xC5,0xD7,0x55,0x94, 0xCF,0x10,0x06,0x81,0xF0,0x44,0xBA,0xE3, 0xF3,0xFE,0xC0,0x8A,0xAD,0xBC,0x48,0x04, 0xDF,0xC1,0x75,0x63,0x30,0x1A,0x0E,0x6D, 0x4C,0x14,0x35,0x2F,0xE1,0xA2,0xCC,0x39, 0x57,0xF2,0x82,0x47,0xAC,0xE7,0x2B,0x95, 0xA0,0x98,0xD1,0x7F,0x66,0x7E,0xAB,0x83, 0xCA,0x29,0xD3,0x3C,0x79,0xE2,0x1D,0x76, 0x3B,0x56,0x4E,0x1E,0xDB,0x0A,0x6C,0xE4, 0x5D,0x6E,0xEF,0xA6,0xA8,0xA4,0x37,0x8B, 0x32,0x43,0x59,0xB7,0x8C,0x64,0xD2,0xE0, 0xB4,0xFA,0x07,0x25,0xAF,0x8E,0xE9,0x18, 0xD5,0x88,0x6F,0x72,0x24,0xF1,0xC7,0x51, 0x23,0x7C,0x9C,0x21,0xDD,0xDC,0x86,0x85, 0x90,0x42,0xC4,0xAA,0xD8,0x05,0x01,0x12, 0xA3,0x5F,0xF9,0xD0,0x91,0x58,0x27,0xB9, 0x38,0x13,0xB3,0x33,0xBB,0x70,0x89,0xA7, 0xB6,0x22,0x92,0x20,0x49,0xFF,0x78,0x7A, 0x8F,0xF8,0x80,0x17,0xDA,0x31,0xC6,0xB8, 0xC3,0xB0,0x77,0x11,0xCB,0xFC,0xD6,0x3A }; unsigned int Tkip_Sbox_Upper[256] = { 0xC6,0xF8,0xEE,0xF6,0xFF,0xD6,0xDE,0x91, 0x60,0x02,0xCE,0x56,0xE7,0xB5,0x4D,0xEC, 0x8F,0x1F,0x89,0xFA,0xEF,0xB2,0x8E,0xFB, 0x41,0xB3,0x5F,0x45,0x23,0x53,0xE4,0x9B, 0x75,0xE1,0x3D,0x4C,0x6C,0x7E,0xF5,0x83, 0x68,0x51,0xD1,0xF9,0xE2,0xAB,0x62,0x2A, 0x08,0x95,0x46,0x9D,0x30,0x37,0x0A,0x2F, 0x0E,0x24,0x1B,0xDF,0xCD,0x4E,0x7F,0xEA, 0x12,0x1D,0x58,0x34,0x36,0xDC,0xB4,0x5B, 0xA4,0x76,0xB7,0x7D,0x52,0xDD,0x5E,0x13, 0xA6,0xB9,0x00,0xC1,0x40,0xE3,0x79,0xB6, 0xD4,0x8D,0x67,0x72,0x94,0x98,0xB0,0x85, 0xBB,0xC5,0x4F,0xED,0x86,0x9A,0x66,0x11, 0x8A,0xE9,0x04,0xFE,0xA0,0x78,0x25,0x4B, 0xA2,0x5D,0x80,0x05,0x3F,0x21,0x70,0xF1, 0x63,0x77,0xAF,0x42,0x20,0xE5,0xFD,0xBF, 0x81,0x18,0x26,0xC3,0xBE,0x35,0x88,0x2E, 0x93,0x55,0xFC,0x7A,0xC8,0xBA,0x32,0xE6, 0xC0,0x19,0x9E,0xA3,0x44,0x54,0x3B,0x0B, 0x8C,0xC7,0x6B,0x28,0xA7,0xBC,0x16,0xAD, 0xDB,0x64,0x74,0x14,0x92,0x0C,0x48,0xB8, 0x9F,0xBD,0x43,0xC4,0x39,0x31,0xD3,0xF2, 0xD5,0x8B,0x6E,0xDA,0x01,0xB1,0x9C,0x49, 0xD8,0xAC,0xF3,0xCF,0xCA,0xF4,0x47,0x10, 0x6F,0xF0,0x4A,0x5C,0x38,0x57,0x73,0x97, 0xCB,0xA1,0xE8,0x3E,0x96,0x61,0x0D,0x0F, 0xE0,0x7C,0x71,0xCC,0x90,0x06,0xF7,0x1C, 0xC2,0x6A,0xAE,0x69,0x17,0x99,0x3A,0x27, 0xD9,0xEB,0x2B,0x22,0xD2,0xA9,0x07,0x33, 0x2D,0x3C,0x15,0xC9,0x87,0xAA,0x50,0xA5, 0x03,0x59,0x09,0x1A,0x65,0xD7,0x84,0xD0, 0x82,0x29,0x5A,0x1E,0x7B,0xA8,0x6D,0x2C }; { 0xA5,0x84,0x99,0x8D,0x0D,0xBD,0xB1,0x54, 0x50,0x03,0xA9,0x7D,0x19,0x62,0xE6,0x9A, 0x45,0x9D,0x40,0x87,0x15,0xEB,0xC9,0x0B, 0xEC,0x67,0xFD,0xEA,0xBF,0xF7,0x96,0x5B, 0xC2,0x1C,0xAE,0x6A,0x5A,0x41,0x02,0x4F, 0x5C,0xF4,0x34,0x08,0x93,0x73,0x53,0x3F, 0x0C,0x52,0x65,0x5E,0x28,0xA1,0x0F,0xB5, 0x09,0x36,0x9B,0x3D,0x26,0x69,0xCD,0x9F, 0x1B,0x9E,0x74,0x2E,0x2D,0xB2,0xEE,0xFB, 0xF6,0x4D,0x61,0xCE,0x7B,0x3E,0x71,0x97, 0xF5,0x68,0x00,0x2C,0x60,0x1F,0xC8,0xED, 0xBE,0x46,0xD9,0x4B,0xDE,0xD4,0xE8,0x4A, 0x6B,0x2A,0xE5,0x16,0xC5,0xD7,0x55,0x94, 0xCF,0x10,0x06,0x81,0xF0,0x44,0xBA,0xE3, 0xF3,0xFE,0xC0,0x8A,0xAD,0xBC,0x48,0x04, 0xDF,0xC1,0x75,0x63,0x30,0x1A,0x0E,0x6D, 0x4C,0x14,0x35,0x2F,0xE1,0xA2,0xCC,0x39, 0x57,0xF2,0x82,0x47,0xAC,0xE7,0x2B,0x95, 0xA0,0x98,0xD1,0x7F,0x66,0x7E,0xAB,0x83, 0xCA,0x29,0xD3,0x3C,0x79,0xE2,0x1D,0x76, 0x3B,0x56,0x4E,0x1E,0xDB,0x0A,0x6C,0xE4, 0x5D,0x6E,0xEF,0xA6,0xA8,0xA4,0x37,0x8B, 0x32, 0x43, 0x59, 0xB7, 0x8C, 0x64, 0xD2, 0xE0, 0xB4, 0xFA, 0x07, 0x25, 0xAF, 0x8E, 0xE9, 0x18, 0xD5, 0x88, 0x6F, 0x72, 0x24, 0xF1, 0xC7, 0x51, 0x23, 0x7C, 0x9C, 0x21, 0xDD, 0xDC, 0x86, 0x85, 0x90, 0x42, 0xC4, 0xAA, 0xD8, 0x05, 0x01, 0x12, 0xA3, 0x5F, 0xF9, 0xD0, 0x91, 0x58, 0x27, 0xB9, 0x38, 0x13, 0xB3, 0x33, 0xBB, 0x70, 0x89, 0xA7, 0xB6, 0x22, 0x92, 0x20, 0x49, 0xFF, 0x78, 0x7A, 0x8F, 0xF8, 0x80, 0x17, 0xDA, 0x31, 0xC6, 0xB8, 0xC3, 0xB0, 0x77, 0x11, 0xCB, 0xFC, 0xD6, 0x3A }; unsigned int Tkip_Sbox_Upper[256] = { 0xC6, 0xF8, 0xEE, 0xF6, 0xFF, 0xD6, 0xDE, 0x91, 0x60, 0x02, 0xCE, 0x56, 0xE7, 0xB5, 0x4D, 0xEC, 0x8F, 0x1F, 0x89, 0xFA, 0xEF, 0xB2, 0x8E, 0xFB, 0x41, 0xB3, 0x5F, 0x45, 0x23, 0x53, 0xE4, 0x9B, 0x75, 0xE1, 0x3D, 0x4C, 0x6C, 0x7E, 0xF5, 0x83, 0x68, 0x51, 0xD1, 0xF9, 0xE2, 0xAB, 0x62, 0x2A, 0x08, 0x95, 0x46, 0x9D, 0x30, 0x37, 0x0A, 0x2F, 0x0E, 0x24, 0x1B, 0xDF, 0xCD, 0x4E, 0x7F, 0xEA, 0x12, 0x1D, 0x58, 0x34, 0x36, 0xDC, 0xB4, 0x5B, 0xA4, 0x76, 0xB7, 0x7D, 0x52, 0xDD, 0x5E, 0x13, 0xA6, 0xB9, 0x00, 0xC1, 0x40, 0xE3, 0x79, 0xB6, 0xD4, 0x8D, 0x67, 0x72, 0x94, 0x98, 0xB0, 0x85, 0xBB, 0xC5, 0x4F, 0xED, 0x86, 0x9A, 0x66, 0x11, 0x8A, 0xE9, 0x04, 0xFE, 0xA0, 0x78, 0x25, 0x4B, 0xA2, 0x5D, 0x80, 0x05, 0x3F, 0x21, 0x70, 0xF1, 0x63, 0x77, 0xAF, 0x42, 0x20, 0xE5, 0xFD, 0xBF, 0x81, 0x18, 0x26, 0xC3, 0xBE, 0x35, 0x88, 0x2E, 0x93, 0x55, 0xFC, 0x7A, 0xC8, 0xBA, 0x32, 0xE6, 0xC0, 0x19, 0x9E, 0xA3, 0x44, 0x54, 0x3B, 0x0B, 0x8C, 0xC7, 0x6B, 0x28, 0xA7, 0xBC, 0x16, 0xAD, 0xDB, 0x64, 0x74, 0x14, 0x92, 0x0C, 0x48, 0xB8, 0x9F, 0xBD, 0x43, 0xC4, 0x39, 0x31, 0xD3, 0xF2, 0xD5, 0x8B, 0x6E, 0xDA, 0x01, 0xB1, 0x9C, 0x49, 0xD8, 0xAC, 0xF3, 0xCF, 0xCA, 0xF4, 0x47, 0x10, 0x6F, 0xF0, 0x4A, 0x5C, 0x38, 0x57, 0x73, 0x97, 0xCB, 0xA1, 0xE8, 0x3E, 0x96, 0x61, 0x0D, 0x0F, 0xE0, 0x7C, 0x71, 0xCC, 0x90, 0x06, 0xF7, 0x1C, 0xC2, 0x6A, 0xAE, 0x69, 0x17, 0x99, 0x3A, 0x27, 0xD9, 0xEB, 0x2B, 0x22, 0xD2, 0xA9, 0x07, 0x33, 0x2D, 0x3C, 0x15, 0xC9, 0x87, 0xAA, 0x50, 0xA5, 0x03, 0x59, 0x09, 0x1A, 0x65, 0xD7, 0x84, 0xD0, 0x82, 0x29, 0x5A, 0x1E, 0x7B, 0xA8, 0x6D { printf("find a linear structure in tkip sbox!\n"); printf("F(x)^F(x^a)=constant\n"); printf("a=%u, constant=%u\n", a, temp); } } if (LinStruExist==0) printf("no linear structure in sbox is found!\n"); } ⑤The timing program for different loop counts in step2 of phase 2: #include <stdio.h> #include <stdlib.h> #include <time.h> #include <Windows.h> typedef unsigned char byte; /* 8-bit byte (octet) */ typedef unsigned short u16b; /* 16-bit unsigned word */ typedef unsigned long u32b; /* 32-bit unsigned word */ /* macros for extraction/creation of byte/u16b values */ #define RotR1(v16) ((((v16) /* fixed algorithm "parameters" */ #define PHASE1_LOOP_CNT 8 /* this needs to be "big enough" */ #define TA_SIZE 6 /* 48-bit transmitter address */ #define TK_SIZE 16 /* 128-bit Temporal Key */ #define P1K_SIZE 5 /* 80-bit Phase1 key */ /* Note here P1K_SIZE=5 not 10 ! */ #define RC4_KEY_SIZE 16 /* 128-bit RC4KEY (104 bits unknown) */ #define PHASE2_LOOP_CNT 1 /* test the different time cost by changing this value ! */ /* 2-byte by 2-byte subset of the full AES S-box table */ const u16b Sbox [2] [256]= /* Sbox for hash (can be in ROM) */ { { 0xC6A5,0xF884,0xEE99,0xF68D,0xFF0D,0xD6BD,0xDEB1,0x9154, 0x6050,0x0203,0xCEA9,0x567D,0xE719,0xB562,0x4DE6,0xEC9A, 0x8F45,0x1F9D,0x8940,0xFA87,0xEF15,0xB2EB,0x8EC9,0xFB0B, 0x41EC,0xB367,0x5FFD,0x45EA,0x23BF,0x53F7,0xE496,0x9B5B, 0x75C2,0xE11C,0x3DAE,0x4C6A,0x6C5A,0x7E41,0xF502,0x834F, 0x685C,0x51F4,0xD134,0xF908,0xE293,0xAB73,0x6253,0x2A3F, 0x080C,0x9552,0x4665,0x9D5E,0x3028,0x37A1,0x0A0F,0x2FB5, 0x0E09,0x2436,0x1B9B,0xDF3D,0xCD26,0x4E69,0x7FCD,0xEA9F, 0x121B,0x1D9E,0x5874,0x342E,0x362D,0xDCB2,0xB4EE,0x5BFB, 0xA4F6,0x764D,0xB761,0x7DCE,0x527B,0xDD3E,0x5E71,0x1397, 0xA6F5,0xB968,0x0000,0xC12C,0x4060,0xE31F,0x79C8,0xB6ED, 0xD4BE,0x8D46,0x67D9,0x724B,0x94DE,0x98D4,0xB0E8,0x854A, 0xBB6B,0xC52A,0x4FE5,0xED16,0x86C5,0x9AD7,0x6655,0x1194, 0x8ACF,0xE910,0x0406,0xFE81,0xA0F0,0x7844,0x25BA,0x4BE3, 0xA2F3,0x5DFE,0x80C0,0x058A,0x3FAD,0x21BC,0x7048,0xF104, 0x63DF,0x77C1,0xAF75,0x4263,0x2030,0xE51A,0xFD0E,0xBF6D, 0x814C,0x1814,0x2635,0xC32F,0xBEE1,0x35A2,0x88CC,0x2E39, 0x9357,0x55F2,0xFC82,0x7A47,0xC8AC,0xBAE7,0x322B,0xE695, 0xC0A0,0x1998,0x9ED1,0xA37F,0x4466,0x547E,0x3BAB,0x0B83, 0x8CCA,0xC729,0x6BD3,0x283C,0xA779,0xBCE2,0x161D,0xAD76, 0xDB3B,0x6456,0x744E,0x141E,0x92DB,0x0C0A,0x486C,0xB8E4, 0x9F5D,0xBD6E,0x43EF,0xC4A6,0x39A8,0x31A4,0xD337,0xF28B, 0xD532,0x8B43,0x6E59,0xDAB7,0x018C,0xB164,0x9CD2,0x49E0, 0xD8B4,0xACFA,0xF307,0xCF25,0xCAAF,0xF48E,0x47E9,0x1018, 0x6FD5,0xF088,0x4A6F,0x5C72,0x3824,0x57F1,0x73C7,0x9751, 0xCB23,0xA17C,0xE89C,0x3E21,0x96DD,0x61DC,0x0D86,0x0F85, 0xE090,0x7C42,0x71C4,0xCCAA,0x90D8,0x0605,0xF701,0x1C12, 0xC2A3,0x6A5F,0xAEF9,0x69D0,0x1791,0x9958,0x3A27,0x27B9, 0xD938,0xEB13,0x2BB3,0x2233,0xD2BB,0xA970,0x0789,0x33A7, 0x2DB6,0x3C22,0x1592,0xC920,0x8749,0xAAFF,0x5078,0xA57A, 0x038F,0x59F8,0x0980,0x1A17,0x65DA,0xD731,0x84C6,0xD0B8, 0x82C3,0x29B0,0x5A77,0x1E11,0x7BCB,0xA8FC,0x6DD6,0x2C3A, }, { /* second half of table is byte-reversed version of first! */ 0xA5C6,0x84F8,0x99EE,0x8DF6,0x0DFF,0xBDD6,0xB1DE,0x5491, 0x5060,0x0302,0xA9CE,0x7D56,0x19E7,0x62B5,0xE64D,0x9AEC, 0x458F,0x9D1F,0x4089,0x87FA,0x15EF,0xEBB2,0xC98E,0x0BFB, 0xEC41,0x67B3,0xFD5F,0xEA45,0xBF23,0xF753,0x96E4,0x5B9B, 0xC275,0x1CE1,0xAE3D,0x6A4C,0x5A6C,0x417E,0x02F5,0x4F83, 0x5C68,0xF451,0x34D1,0x08F9,0x93E2,0x73AB,0x5362,0x3F2A, 0x0C08,0x5295,0x6546,0x5E9D,0x2830,0xA137,0x0F0A,0xB52F, 0x090E,0x3624,0x9B1B,0x3DDF,0x26CD,0x694E,0xCD7F,0x9FEA, 0x1B12,0x9E1D,0x7458,0x2E34,0x2D36,0xB2DC,0xEEB4,0xFB5B, 0xF6A4,0x4D76,0x61B7,0xCE7D,0x7B52,0x3EDD,0x715E,0x9713, 0xF5A6,0x68B9,0x0000,0x2CC1,0x6040,0x1FE3,0xC879,0xEDB6, 0xBED4,0x468D,0xD967,0x4B72,0xDE94,0xD498,0xE8B0,0x4A85, 0x6BBB,0x2AC5,0xE54F,0x16ED,0xC586,0xD79A,0x5566,0x9411, 0xCF8A,0x10E9,0x0604,0x81FE,0xF0A0,0x4478,0xBA25,0xE34B, 0xF3A2,0xFE5D,0xC080,0x8A05,0xAD3F,0xBC21,0x4870,0x04F1, 0xDF63,0xC177,0x75AF,0x6342,0x3020,0x1AE5,0x0EFD,0x6DBF, 0x4C81,0x1418,0x3526,0x2FC3,0xE1BE,0xA235,0xCC88,0x392E, 0x5793,0xF255,0x82FC,0x477A,0xACC8,0xE7BA,0x2B32,0x95E6, 0xA0C0,0x9819,0xD19E,0x7FA3,0x6644,0x7E54,0xAB3B,0x830B, 0xCA8C,0x29C7,0xD36B,0x3C28,0x79A7,0xE2BC,0x1D16,0x76AD, 0x3BDB,0x5664,0x4E74,0x1E14,0xDB92,0x0A0C,0x6C48,0xE4B8, 0x5D9F,0x6EBD,0xEF43,0xA6C4,0xA839,0xA431,0x37D3,0x8BF2, 0x32D5,0x438B,0x596E,0xB7DA,0x8C01,0x64B1,0xD29C,0xE049, 0xB4D8,0xFAAC,0x07F3,0x25CF,0xAFCA,0x8EF4,0xE947,0x1810, 0xD56F,0x88F0,0x6F4A,0x725C,0x2438,0xF157,0xC773,0x5197, 0x23CB,0x7CA1,0x9CE8,0x213E,0xDD96,0xDC61,0x860D,0x850F, 0x90E0,0x427C,0xC471,0xAACC,0xD890,0x0506,0x01F7,0x121C, 0xA3C2,0x5F6A,0xF9AE,0xD069,0x9117,0x5899,0x273A,0xB927, 0x38D9,0x13EB,0xB32B,0x3322,0xBBD2,0x70A9,0x8907,0xA733, 0xB62D,0x223C,0x9215,0x20C9,0x4987,0xFFAA,0x7850,0x7AA5, 0x8F03,0xF859,0x8009,0x171A,0xDA65,0x31D7,0xC684,0xB8D0, 0xC382,0xB029,0x775A,0x111E,0xCB7B,0xFCA8,0xD66D,0x3A2C, } };
void Phase1(u16b *P1K,const byte *TK,const byte *TA,u32b IV32); void Phase2(byte *RC4KEY,const byte *TK,const u16b *P1K,u16b IV16); /* ********************************************************************** * Routine: Phase 1 --generate P1K, given TA, TK, IV32 * * This function only needs to be called every 2**16 frames, * although in theory it could be called every frame. * ********************************************************************** */ void Phase1(u16b *P1K,const byte *TK,const byte *TA,u32b IV32) { int i; /* Initialize the 80 bits of P1K[] from IV32 and TA[0..5] */ /* ********************************************************************** * Main ********************************************************************** */ void main() { unsigned int j; byte TA [TA_SIZE] (1); } Phase1Millisecond=(float)(1000) * (lpPhase2Start->LowPart -lpPhase1Start->LowPart + 4294967296*(lpPhase2Start->HighPart -lpPhase1Start->HighPart) ) / lpFrequency->LowPart; Phase1Second=Phase1Millisecond / 1000; Phase2Millisecond=(float)(1000) * (lpPhase2End->LowPart -lpPhase2Start->LowPart + 4294967296*(lpPhase2Start->HighPart -lpPhase1Start->HighPart)) / lpFrequency->LowPart; Phase2Second=Phase2Millisecond / 1000; printf("In Phase1, %f millisecond elapsed.\n", Phase1Millisecond); printf("In Phase1, %f second elapsed.\n", Phase1Second); printf("In Phase2, %f millisecond elapsed.\n", Phase2Millisecond); printf("In Phase2, %f second elapsed.\n", Phase2Second); }
